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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

TWINE V. STATE: SEX OFFENDERS WHO BECOME
HOMELESS WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE SUBJECT TO
PROSECUTION WHEN THEY FAIL TO NOTIFY THE
MARYLAND SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY THAT THEY
HA VE CHANGED RESIDENCE.

By: Matthew Luzuriaga
The Court of Appeals held that the sex offender registration statute
in Criminal Procedure Article Section 11-721, does not necessarily
impose an obligation on homeless sex offenders to notify the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services of a change in
residence. Twine v. State, 395 Md. 539, 910 A.2d 1132 (2006).
Raymond Twine ("Twine") was originally convicted of a third
degree sex offense in July 2002. As a result, Twine was required by
the Maryland Sex Offender Statute ("the Statute") to register with the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("the
Department") and additionally notify the Department of any change in
residence.
Following his conviction, Twine complied with the requirements
under the statute by submitting to yearly fingerprinting and registering
all changes in his address through July 2004 when he moved to 20013
Sweetgum Circle. Twine lived at this address for only a short period of
time before becoming homeless. Twine notified a detective charged
with monitoring registered sex offenders in Montgomery County of
his homeless status orally, but did not officially file a change of
residence form. In December 2004, the Montgomery County Police
were notified that Twine no longer lived at his last registered address,
and filed charges in response to this noncompliance.
At trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Twine was
convicted for violating section 11-721(a) of the Criminal Procedure
Article. Twine was convicted and sentenced to be incarcerated for ten
days. He filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. Prior to a decision being issued by the Court of Special
Appeals, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether
the Statute and registration requirement apply to homeless persons.
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The Court examined the Statute and interpreted its meaning,
purpose, and the intent of the legislature when it was written .. Twine,
395 Md. 539, 547, 910 A.2d 1132, 1136. Section 11-721(a) provides:
"A registrant may not knowingly fail to register, knowingly fail to
provide the written notice required under § 11-705 (d), (e), or (f) of
this subtitle, or knowingly provide false information of a material
fact as required by this subtitle." Twine, 395 Md. at 547, 910 A.2d at
1137. Twine was allegedly in violation of section 11-705(d) of the
Criminal Procedure Article, which requires written notice to be sent to
the Department within five days of a change in residence. Twine, 395
Md. at 547,910 A.2d at 1137.
The Court took notice, in its analysis that the Statute uses the terms
"residence" and "address" interchangeably, while defining neither. [d
at 584,910 A.2d at 1137. Given the ambiguity of the terms within the
Statute, the Court reduced the issue to whether Twine changed
residences when he was evicted from the Sweetgum Circle apartment
in August 2004 and became homeless. [d. at 549,910 A.2d at 1138.
When interpreting the Statute, the Court revisited the established
rule of statutory construction which gives effect to the intent of the
legislature that originally enacted the statute. [d. The Court first looks
to the plain meaning of the Statute, giving it effect if it is unambiguous
and consistent with its apparent purpose. [d. Additionally, the Court
avoids a " ... construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical,
or inconsistent with common sense." [d.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that, given the plain meanings of
"address" and "residence," both terms imply a degree of permanence
or intent to return to a specific place, which Twine, concededly, did
not have. [d. Further, the Court noted that the statute did not address
how homeless sex offenders could properly comply with the
registration requirement. /d. Finally, the Court concluded that
because Twine did not change residences within the interpreted
meaning of section 11-705(d) of the Criminal Procedure Article when
he became homeless the Statute did not apply, and that he had no
obligation to update his registration. Twine, 395 Md. at 549, 910 A.2d
at 1138.
In support, the Court also relied upon persuasive authority from the
State of Washington. Twine, 395 Md. at 558, 910 A.2d at 1139. The
Washington Court of Appeals held that Washington's sex offender
registration requirement did not impose an obligation on homeless
persons to report any change in residence. Twine, 395 Md. at 558, 910
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A.2d at 1139 (citing State v. Pickett, 95 Wash. App. 475 (1999)). The
Washington statute shared similar language with the Maryland one,
using "residence," "address," and "resident address" interchangeably
and the reviewing court relied on their plain meanings to imply a sense
of permanency or intent to return to one place. Id. The appellant in
that case was homeless, sleeping on sidewalks and streets, and
therefore the statute did not apply to him. Id. at 552, 910 A.2d at
1139.
Also persuasive was a Minnesota case where the Minnesota
Supreme Court examined Minnesota's sex offender registration statute
that used the terms "residence," "address," and "living address"
without any distinction. Twine, 395 Md. at 552, 910 A.2d at 1139
(citing State v. Iverson, 664 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 2003)). Applying the
plain meaning rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statute
did not mean that a person's living location, or wherever a person
happens to be staying was their "residence." Id. The Minnesota
Supreme Court stated that any other reading of the statute would be
inconsistent with the statute's intent, and held that future cases of
similar circumstances would have to be examined individually to
determine if compliance with the registration requirement was even
possible. Id.
Despite some structural differences between the Maryland,
Washington, and Minnesota sex offender statutes, the Court held that
the plain meanings of "residence" and "address" imply that the
legislative intent of the statute did not encompass homeless persons.
/d. at 553, 910 A.2d at 1140. The Court also concluded that a sex
offender registrant has a "residence" when they have a fixed location,
such as a shelter, at which they live or intend upon returning to. Id.
Based on its interpretation of "residence," the Court found an
insufficient amount of evidence that Twine had a residence, given that
both parties conceded at trial that Twine had been "staying wherever
he could." /d. at 554,910 A.2d at 1141.
In a related note, the Court stated that any homeless defendant
charged with violating the statute would need to present evidence to
show that they were homeless. Id. Once the issue is raised and
evidence is offered by the defendant, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant otherwise had a residence and
could properly comply with the registration requirement. Id.

The holding of the Court indicates Maryland's understanding
attitude toward homeless people, generally. However, Twine rests on
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the stipulation that Twine was staying "wherever he could," implying
that Maryland may recognize different "degrees" of homelessness to
which the Statute will not apply equally. Twine seems to be setting the
Court up for more, rather than less litigation, creating a rule requiring
case-by case analysis, rather than establishing a black-letter rule.

